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Firm Specific Wage Spread in Germany -  
Decomposition of regional differences in inter firm wage dispersion 
 
Abstract 
The purpose of this paper is to sort out firm-related differences from effects that re-
sult from different economic structures. A non-parametric decomposition is used to 
analyse firm level difference between the wage spread in the two major regions of 
unified Germany. If firm-specific effects explain wage dispersion between firms, a 
decomposition of the wage dispersion between firms is necessary. The decomposi-
tion can help to find out, whether the economy-wide results for different regions are 
due to the composition of the regional economies by industries and firm-size, or 
whether the differences are due to firm-specific influences, like distinctions in market 
power. For Germany, a considerable part of the difference in the wage spread be-
tween the East and the West can be explained by different economic structures. 
However, by far the greater part of the difference in the wage spread between firms 
in the two parts of the country results from lower wages paid by firms of the same 
type in East Germany compared with their counterparts in West Germany.  
JEL Classification Numbers:  
L16, C14, J30 
Keywords: 
Productivity, Wage Differentiation, Wage Spread, Firm Wage Levels, Wage Sharing, 
Non Parametric Analysis, Decomposition 
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1 Motivation 
It is widely accepted in the literature that firm productivity and wage dispersion be-
tween firms are inter-related (Lallemand/Plasman/Rycx, 2005). However, different 
explanations exist for the direction of causality between these two variables. While 
some authors assume that firms pay higher wages to motivate workers and to im-
prove their productivity (“efficiency wages”), others argue that higher wages might be 
the result of higher profits of successful firms (“rent-sharing”).  
Micro-data analyses can be helpful to understand to what extent a differing degree of 
unobservable heterogeneity of labour may explain productivity differences between 
regions. In particular, the productivity of two workers with the same observable indi-
vidual characteristics may differ because they are employed by different firms. Some 
of these firm-related differences may again be attributed to observable firm-
characteristics such as industry or firm-size. However, there may remain a purely 
firm-specific “fixed-effect” on productivity. 
The purpose of this paper is to sort out these firm-related differences. If firm-specific 
effects explain wage dispersion between firms, a decomposition of the wage disper-
sion between firms is necessary. The decomposition might help to find out, whether 
the economy-wide results for the different regions are due to the composition of the 
regional economies by industries and firm-size, or whether the differences are due to 
firm-specific influences.  
In particular, we decompose the wage dispersion between firms into “structural com-
ponents” related to the composition of firm-types (identified by sectoral affiliation and 
firm-size) and purely firm-specific influences. This decomposition is carried out for 
two seemingly distinct major German regions, East- and West Germany. If extended 
to other countries the decomposition might also help to find out, whether the econ-
omy-wide results for different countries are due to the composition of the national 
economies by industries and firm-size, or whether the differences are due to firm-
specific influences. Particularly, for the comparison of the wage dispersion between 
the several regions, such a decomposition will enhance the knowledge on the influ-
ence of wage dispersion on productivity performance of the regions.  
                                            
2 EU KLEMS, Productivity in the European Union: A Comparative Industry Approach, EU Sixth 
Framework Programme. 
 4
In the major market economies, a process of increasing wage differentiation started 
before 1990, although to very differing degrees. Whereas relatively marked wage dif-
ferentials had always been evident in the United States, in some European countries, 
particularly Germany, differences in wage levels remained relatively small (Christen-
sen/Schimmelpfennig, 1998).3 Meanwhile, the transition economies of Central and 
Eastern Europe experienced major changes in wage distributions as workers’ wages 
started to vary significantly with enterprise performance  (Basu/Estrin/Svejnar, 2004). 
In view of these tendencies it might be expected that after reunification East Ger-
many would - parallel to the strong rise in wages that was evident - have experi-
enced a rapid differentiation in wage levels. Starting from a very flat wage structure 
among both workers and firms (Gornig/Schwarze, 1990; Stephan/Wiedemann, 
1990), empirical results indicate that the dispersion of wages among East German 
workers indeed increased significantly (Franz/Steiner, 1999). Yet, there is little 
knowledge of how wage differences between firms in East Germany have devel-
oped. However, firm data from the statistics on persons employed paying statutory 
social insurance contributions4 does indicate that wage differences between firms in 
East Germany have increased markedly (table 1). 
In 2001, the variance was a good 50 % above the 1994 level, so the tendency to 
greater wage differentiation between firms in East Germany was growing at the end 
of the 1990s. The average annual rate of change in this variance rose from 5.3 % in 
the period 1994 to 1998 to 6.9 % between 1998 and 2001, while the growth in the 
wage level diminished at the same time. The relative variability, measured by the 
variation coefficient of the wage level between firms, also increased strongly.  
 
 
                                            
3
 As globalisation progressed, economists argued that greater wage differentiation was needed in 
Germany, too. The call for adequate wage differentiation runs through several reports of Germany’s 
Council of Economic Experts (the ‘Sachverständigenrat’ (SVR) - SVR‘94, Items 447ff., SVR‘99, Item 
341). The main emphasis is on differentiation to reflect skills levels (SVR‘00, Items 416f.), but with the 
persistently high level of unemployment, the demands for wage differentiation between firms also 
grew (Siebert, 1998, SVR’04, Items 704ff.). This is reflected i.a. in the growing number of wage 
agreements for individual firms and the number of opt-out clauses in the collective agreements for 
companies in financial difficulties, and in the declining number of companies that are bound by the 
national collective agreements (Ellgut/Kohaut, 2004). 
4
 On the data base see also the remarks in Section 4. 
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Table 1 
Wage Differences between Establishments in East Germany, 1994 to 2001 
 
However, how the degree of wage differentiation between firms in East Germany 
now reached is to be assessed cannot be deduced from its development alone. It 
remains an open question whether East Germany has already fully exploited the po-
tential for wage differentiation between firms under market economy conditions, or 
whether, with fewer firms bound by the collective wage agreements and greater pos-
sibilities for making use of opt-out clauses, greater wage differentiation has actually 
formed there. 
In order to classify and assess the degree of wage differentiation between firms now 
reached in East Germany this paper shows and analyses the differences in the wage 
differentiation between firms in East and West Germany. For this, first the current 
state of empirical research into possible explanations of the differences in wages 
paid by firms will be outlined. In order to quantify the influence of the main determi-
nants of firm wage levels as given in the literature firms of the same size and in the 
same sector will be compared, using a non-parametric decomposition estimate. So 
far, this has been used mainly to explain differences in wage levels between men 
and women, for instance (Nopo, 2004) or between regions (Görzig/Gornig/Werwatz, 
Jahr 1994 1998 2001
Variance in establishment wage levels  In euro² 284,2 349,9 427,2
Memo item:
Coefficient of variation In % 41,0 41,8 45,2
Average wage level for establishments In euro 41,2 44,8 45,8
Annual average change from previous period in %
Variance in establishment wage levels  5,3 6,9
Memo item:
Coefficient of variation 0,5 2,7
Average wage level for establishments 2,1 0,7
a Wage level measured as the average day’s wage per person employed in the establishment.
Source: Federal Labour Agency, Annual reports for employment statistics.
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2004). Here the approach is widened and applied to an analysis of the East-West 
comparison of wage levels in firms. 
2 Determinants of Firm Wage Levels 
The theoretical justification of the demand for greater wage differentiation is the con-
sideration that wages that are not geared to the marginal product cause disequilibria 
on the labour market and are thus one of the causes of the persistent level of unem-
ployment. In the perfect competition model, equilibrium can only be achieved if the 
differences in workers’ contributions to output corresponding to their skill levels are 
taken into account in different wage levels. 
However, in the empirical examination of wage differences between firms doubts 
have repeatedly arisen (Krueger/Summers, 1988) whether wage differences be-
tween firms can be explained exclusively by the heterogeneity of the labour input, 
even if differences in quality that are not observed are taken into account beside 
those that are observed. Rather, it has been suggested that a large part of the wage 
differences that can be observed are due to firm heterogeneity (Gibbons/Katz, 1991; 
Dickens/Katz, 1987). 
The relatively great importance of firm factors for differences in wage levels is also 
confirmed by a large number of more recent studies based on comprehensive em-
ployer-employee data sets (Abowd/Kramarz/Margolis, 1999; Winter-
Ebmer/Zweimüller, 1999; Goux/Maurin, 1999). The extent to which firm factors are 
seen as the explanation depends on the method used, but it also depends on the 
type and size of the control variables used and on the region under examination. 
Abowd/Kramarz (2000) used an employer-employee data set to study the US federal 
state of Washington, and concluded that about 50 percent of the observable wage 
differences were due to firm factors. 
The firm determinants that can be shown to have an outstanding influence on the 
wage level even when a large number of other factors are also taken into account 
generally include the economic sector and the size of the firm. That also applies to 
East and West Germany, although not right across the board (Bellmann/Kohaut, 
1999). 
Sector-specific wage differences are remarkably persistent over time and the struc-
tures are similar by international comparison (Krueger/Summers, 1988). The latter is 
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also confirmed by a more recent comparison of wage structures in France with those 
in the US federal state of Washington (Abowd/Kramarz, 2000). However, clear dif-
ferences are evident concerning regulated economic sectors in France. Studies of 
the new market economies in Eastern Europe (Grundig/Pohl, 2003) have also been 
able to establish remarkably similar sectoral wage structures there.  
There are many theoretical explanations of the influence the company’s economic 
sector exerts on its employees’ wage level. Firstly, institutional conditions on the in-
put side are named, like trade union ties or the presence of a works council 
(Hübler/Jirjahn, 2004). On the other hand, if the data set permits, output side factors 
are frequently also stressed, like the influence of competition 
(Nickell/Vainiomaki/Wadhwani, 1994) and market power on product markets (Blanch-
flower/Machin, 1996; Jirjahn/Klodt, 1999). 
The influence of the firm’s size on its wage level seems to be very stable by interna-
tional comparison, and it is robust when numerous other explanatory variables in tra-
ditional wage equations are taken into account. Moreover, the relation appears to 
have strengthened (Gerlach/Hübler, 1995). As an explanation of the influence of the 
firm’s size on firm wage differentials, in addition to the influence of employee organi-
sations, which changes with the size of the firm, the different degrees of complemen-
tarity of the production factors used and the monitoring expenditure, which also 
changes with the size of the firm, are named (Troske, 1999). Technological factors, 
employees’ preferences, and working conditions also play a part (Idson/Oi, 1999). 
Other explanations can be monopsonistic (single buyer) conditions and implicit rent 
sharing for employees (Green/Machin/Manning, 1996). Brown and Medoff (1989) 
concluded that 50 percent of the differences in firm size-specific wage differentials 
were due to personal factors, and in a more recent longitudinal analysis, based on an 
employer-employee data set for France, Abowd/Kramarz (2000) reached the conclu-
sion that 70 percent of the size-specific wage differences in the “raw” data is due to 
firm-specific features. 
Now that it has been shown, mainly using micro-data sets, that an important part of 
the observable wage differences is due to firm features, many economists have ac-
cepted the conclusion drawn by Blanchflower/Oswald/Sanfey (1996) that the as-
sumption of perfect competition on the companies’ factor markets, and above all on 
their product markets, is not appropriate to explain wage differences. Hence, model 
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approaches based on imperfect competition are becoming increasingly prominent in 
explaining wages (Abowd/Kramarz/Lengermann/Roux, 2005; Sørensen, 2001). 
Increasing attention is also being devoted to the question of implicit rent sharing for 
employees (Blanchflower/Oswald/Sanfey, 1996; Hildreth/Oswald, 1997). Sørensen 
(2001) distinguishes between three factors that can affect wage differences between 
firms. These are differences 
· in the marginal product of employees, 
· in the employees’ bargaining power, and 
· in the companies’ market power on their sales markets. 
Perfect competition on all markets can only be assumed if exclusively the first of 
these factors is present. On imperfect labour markets (second, above), the influence 
of trade unions must also be taken into account or that of other factors that give the 
employees a bargaining position vis-à-vis their employer (Stephan/Gerlach, 2004). 
Depending on the size of the firm that can affect individual firms, but it frequently af-
fects whole sectors, too. 
The case of imperfect product markets (third, above) affects individual firms much 
more strongly. In assessing rent sharing, it is important to understand that in many 
cases the employees’ bargaining power may possibly depend on the company’s 
market power on its sales markets. If companies are successful on their sales mar-
kets owing to their specific market power, irrespective of their size and the sector to 
which they belong, that can also strengthen the in-house bargaining position of their 
employees. 
Using a data set for France, Fakfakh/FitzRoy (2002) were able to show a rent-
sharing effect, after taking into account numerous control variables. Mar-
golis/Salvanes (2001) reach a similar conclusion for France and Norway. Lundin/Yun 
(2003) have shown for Sweden that the wage level is above average particularly in 
those firms that are not exposed to intensive competition from imports. Martins 
(2004) also confirms for Portugal that the rent-sharing hypothesis is significant in ex-
plaining wage differences, and that it is robust against other approaches. 
Using extensive micro-data for companies, Basu/Estrin/Svejnar (2004) show for the 
Czech Republic, Slovakia, Poland and Hungary that a major part of the increased 
wage differentiation after the transition to the market economy can be explained by 
the implicit sharing of profits - and losses - with employees in this transition phase. 
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Abowd/Kramarz/Lengermann/Roux (2005) have calculated a quasi rent for individual 
employees of firms from the difference between wages and their opportunity costs. 
They conclude that by far the greater part of this depends on firm factors. 
A large number of empirical studies have shown that the size of the firm and the sec-
tor-specific nature of its sales market are crucial factors influencing firm wage differ-
ences. Nevertheless, a number of studies have now clearly shown that beyond these 
characteristic features of a firm that can be objectively measured, there are wage dif-
ferences that are evidently closely connected to the firm’s success on sales markets. 
The studies by Abowd/Kramarz/Lengermann/Roux (2005) have shown i.a. that the 
influence of firm factors on the wage differences between firms is considerable in 
some cases, within individual sectors as well. Therefore, if the observable firm wage 
differences are controlled by the influence of the industry and the size of the firm, the 
rent-sharing hypothesis, which has now been confirmed by many studies, suggests 
that the remaining wage differences greatly depend on in how far the individual firms 
succeed in achieving above-average profits through their market power on their 
sales markets. In that case they will also be in a position to pay their employees 
above-average wages. 
3 Methodology 
There is ample empirical evidence for pronounced wage differentials across firms 
and establishments. These differentials usually can be explained -at least to some 
extent- by observable establishment characteristics such as size or sectoral affilia-
tion. In the present case, we use these observable characteristics to decompose the 
difference between East Germany’s wage variability across plants and West Ger-
many’s wage variability across plants. In particular, we ask whether West-East dif-
ferences in wage variability can be attributed to observable differences in the com-
position of plants or rather by differences in wage variability of establishment types 
that can be found in both parts of the country. Put differently, are West-East differ-
ences in wage variability due to the fact that certain plant types (such as large indus-
trial plants) are exclusively or overwhelmingly found in only one part of the country? 
Or should they be “blamed” on West-East differences in the wage variability between 
plants of a given, comparable type?             
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To compare East Germany’s wage variability across plants with that of West Ger-
many and to relate it to observable plant characteristics, we basically employ an 
analysis of variance approach. That is, we use the well-known result that the raw or 
marginal variance is the sum of the variance of the conditional means and the mean 
of the conditional variance. In the present setting, we express, for each part of the 
country, the unconditional variance of plant-level wages as the sum of two sources of 
conditional variation: the variation of plant-type specific average wages around the 
unconditional average and the mean of the plant-type specific variances. In the em-
pirical part, plant types are defined as a combination of plant size (one out of 10 pos-
sible categories) and sectoral affiliation (one out of 54 possible categories) and are 
denoted by x. Using East-Germany to illustrate the notation, we have  
 
{ }
{ } { }
2
| |
(A-East) Variance of the type specific means (B-East) Mean of type specific variances
[ | ] [ | , ] [ | ] ( ) [ | , ] ( )
[ | , ] [ | , ]
E E
x E x E
X E X E
Var Y E E Y x E E Y E f x Var Y x E f x
Var E Y x E E Var Y x E
Î Î
= - +
= +
å å
144424443 144424443
 
where ( )Ef x  is the population fraction of establishment type x in the 
East.5 
The equivalent expression for the West is:  
 
{ }
{ } { }
2
| |
(A-West) Variance of the type specific means (B-West) Means of the type specific variances
[ | ] [ | , ] [ | ] ( ) [ | , ] ( )
[ | , ] [ | , ]
W W
x W x W
X W X W
Var Y W E Y x W E Y W f x Var Y x W f x
Var E Y x W E Var Y x W
Î Î
= - +
= +
å å
144424443 144424443
 
These analysis-of-variance expressions form the basis for analysing the difference 
between plant specific wage variability in the West and the East. They imply that the 
difference of the marginal variances6, [ | ]Var Y W - [ | ]Var Y E , may stem from West-East 
differences either in the “(A)”-terms or the “(B)”-terms: 
                                            
5
 The subscript x EÎ indicates that the summation runs over all elements x belonging to the set E of 
establishment types found in the East. [ ]|X EVar ·  and [ ]|X EE ·  denote the variance and expectation of 
the respective argument with regard to the distribution of establishment types in the East (i.e. the dis-
tribution of X, given East). 
6
 Formally, the difference of the region-specific variances could be defined by reversing the order, i.e. 
by considering [ | ]Var Y E - Var Y W[ | ] . However, the particular order “West minus East” is sug-
gested by the aim of the present paper: studying the adjustment of Eastern wage variability towards 
the reference level provided by the West. 
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{ } { }
{ }
| |
(A-West) (A-East)
Difference of the variances of the conditional means
| |
(B-West)
[ | ] [ | ] [ | , ] [ | , ]
[ | , ] [ | ,
X W X E
X W X O
Var Y W Var Y E Var E Y x W Var E Y x E
E Var Y x W E Var Y x E
- = -
- -
144424443 144424443
14444444424444444443
144424443
{ }
(B-East)
Difference of the Means of the conditional variances
]
144424443
144444444 24444444443
 
The expressions (A-West) and (A-East) represent the variation of the type-specific 
average wages around the respective region-specific unconditional mean. They do 
not directly reflect wage variation between establishments but rather between estab-
lishment types. Their difference, MeanD  , therefore primarily reflects “structural” West-
East differences, i.e. differences in the composition and structure of establishment 
types. The expressions (B-West) und (B-East) however contain for any given type 
the variance of wages across establishments. They are the focal point of this analy-
sis, as they may help to assess the extent to which West-East differences in wage 
variation can be attributed to West-East differences between establishments of a 
given, comparable type.  
However, West-East differences in the „(B)“-terms may not only be caused by differ-
ing type-specific wage variances but also be due to more “structural” causes. This is 
evident from the definition of these terms which, in the case of East Germany, has 
the following form:  
{ } {
{
( )
|
( )( )
(B-East):  [ | , ] [ | , ] ( )
i
E
X E
x E iiiii
E Var Y x E Var Y x E f x
Î
= å 1442443  
This definition involves (i) the support of the distribution of establishment types, (ii) 
the share of each type among all establishments in the region and (iii) the type-
specific variances. West-East differences in the average type-specific variances can 
thus arise from three components 
(i) establishment types existing in only one part of the country (Special Com-
ponent),  
(ii) establishment types existing in both parts of the country, but with unequal 
relative frequencies (Type-Structure Component)  
(iii) establishment types existing in both parts of the country, but with (strongly) 
differing type-specific variances (Regional Component).  
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To capture these three sources of differences between [ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W  and 
| ( | , )X EE Var Y x Eé ùë û , we apply the following decomposition introduced in Nopo’s (2002) 
extension of the well-known work by Blinder (1973) and Oxaca (1973):  
[ ] [ ]
{
| |
(i) Special components (iii) West-East differences in the variances(ii) Different weights of
for comparable types of comparable types of firms 
( | , ) ( | , )X W X E
West East Typ Reg
E Var Y x W E Var Y x E-
= D + D + D + D1442443 {
firms 
 
For reasons of clarity and legibility, the detailed formal definition of each of these 
terms is given in part 1 of the appendix.  
WestD  and EastD  represent the components of West-East differences in plant-level 
wage variation due to the fact that certain plant types are found either exclusively in 
the West or exclusively in the East. If these „exclusive“ establishment types are nu-
merous and furthermore exhibit particularly high or particularly low wage variability 
then they may account for a considerable part of the difference between 
[ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W  and | ( | , )X EE Var Y x Eé ùë û . 
TypD  represents the component of [ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W - | ( | , )X EE Var Y x Eé ùë û attributable to 
West-East differences in the distribution of establishment types common to both 
parts of the country. It accounts for the possibility that the average type-specific vari-
ances may differ between Western Germany and Eastern Germany due to differ-
ences in the type’s relative weights even if all individual type-specific variances were 
exactly equal in the West and the East.     
Finally, RegD  represents the component of the West-East difference in plant-level 
wage variability due to unequal variances among Western and Eastern establish-
ments of a given, comparable type. RegD  may thus be interpreted as the „pure“ West-
East difference in wage variability, as it is the only component solely based on the 
West-East-comparison of variances among establishments belonging to the same 
size class and the same sector. If the variance of plant-level wages is, for instance, 
considerably higher among Western plants of a given size and a given sector than 
among their Eastern counterparts then this can –in the light of the discussion of sec-
tion 2 above- be interpreted as evidence for a greater dispersion of market power, 
profits and rent-sharing among Western establishments. The components WestD , EastD  
and TypD , however, rather reflect „structural“ differences between the Western and 
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the Eastern part of the economy as they attribute differences in wage variability to 
differences in the type and (relative) number of establishments in the two parts of the 
country.  
Recalling the „structural“ interpretation attached above to the difference between the 
variance of type-specific average wages ( { }| [ | , ]X WVar E Y x W - { }| [ | , ]X WVar E Y x W ), we 
arrive at the following comprehensive representation of the potential sources of dif-
ferences between the variances of plant-level wages in Western and Eastern Ger-
many: 
 
{ } { } [ ]| | | |
Difference of the variances Difference of the means
of the conditional means of the conditional variances
[ | ] [ | ]
 
[ | , ] [ | , ] ( | , )X W X E X W X E
Var Y W Var Y E
Var E Y x W Var E Y x E E Var Y x W E V
Mean
- =
+
=
- + -
=
D
14444444424444444443
[ ]( | , )
Economic structure components
ar Y x E
West East Typ Reg
Mean West East Typ Reg
D + D + D + D
D + D + D + D + D
=
14444444424444444443
14444444444444244444444444443
 
In the empirical part of the paper the conditional mean functions [ | , ]E Y x W  and 
[ | , ]E Y x E  and the conditional variance functions [ | , ]Var Y x W  and ( | , )Var Y x E  will be 
estimated nonparametrically by computing –in both Western and Eastern Germany-
the type-specific mean and variance for each establishment type x separately. That 
is, for neither the mean nor the variance any parametric functional form is imposed 
on its relation to establishment type (measured by a plant’s size and a plant’s sec-
tor). 
4 The Data 
For the purposes of this examination, it is necessary to separate the various struc-
tural economic factors that influence the wage differences measured between firms 
from those that exclusively influence firms of the same type. That depends decisively 
on how exactly the difference in the composition of the firm types by branch and size 
of firm in East and West Germany can be evaluated.  
It is difficult to find data that is suitable for the purposes of decomposition that it pro-
vides representative information on the level of wages in firms, their branch and size, 
and is compatible for East and West Germany. Sources frequently used for East-
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West comparisons, like the ZEW Innovation Panel (Rammer et al., 2003) or the IAB 
Business Panel (Bellmann, 2002) do differentiate according to these criteria, but ow-
ing to the small number of cases covered, they are inadequate for regional compari-
sons using a non-parametric approach. 
However, information on the wage level in individual establishments, their branch 
and size, and that covers a high number of cases, can be obtained from the annual 
reports for the employment statistics compiled by the Federal Labour Agency (BA). 
These statistics are primarily intended to provide information on employees that is 
relevant for social insurance purposes. Every establishment that employs at least 
one person paying statutory social insurance contributions is given a number, and 
these numbers enable the information on the employees to be converted into infor-
mation on the establishments. Moreover, the establishments in the database so cre-
ated can also be assigned geographically to East or West Germany through the re-
gional classification of the place of work. 
The annual reports for 2001, for example, give information on about 2.4 million es-
tablishments with just under 37 million jobs. That is nearly a total coverage, with only 
the establishments without any employees paying social insurance contributions not 
included. 
However, a number of problems and distortions also arise in using these employ-
ment statistics (Fritsch/König/Weisshuhn, 1992). Owing to the statutory requirements 
for social insurance, a number of persons and establishments are left out. Moreover, 
the high wage segment is less differentiated, owing to the upper limit for assessment 
of statutory social insurance contributions. However, these limitations are very much 
less distorting in the consideration of average wages in establishments here than 
they are in analyses of individual wage levels. In addition, analyses of establishment 
wage levels in East Germany benefit in that the above shortcomings in the compila-
tion have not fundamentally changed in the period under review. On a comparison of 
the variations in the levels of wages in establishments between East and West Ger-
many it must, however, be borne in mind particularly that the upper limit for assess-
ment in East Germany was about 16 % below that in the West in 2001. So indirectly, 
the variability of the average wages in companies measured is also limited. But since 
at the same time more than 90 % of the employees paying statutory social insurance 
 15 
contributions were paid wages below this upper limit, the results on establishment 
level should be sufficiently informative despite this distortion. 
The data for 1994, 1998, and 2001 has been evaluated. The level of wages in estab-
lishments is shown as the wage per day per person employed. This has been calcu-
lated by dividing the wage by the number of calendar days in the period for which the 
wage was paid. Differences in the average working time per day in the establishment 
were not taken into account. The branches the establishments belong to are classi-
fied into 54 sectors, according to the sectoral classification used by the Federal La-
bour Agency (Annex 1). The companies are divided into 10 size classes, and this 
goes slightly beyond the division usual in the statistics on the producing sector (An-
nex 2). The combination gives 540 cells with correspondingly different types of es-
tablishment, to which the establishments and their wage payments in East and West 
Germany can be assigned. 
5 The Results 
In order to enable an initial estimate to be made of the relative importance of wage 
differences between establishments in East Germany, core density estimates7 were 
made of the distribution of the wages per day paid by the establishments in East and 
West Germany for 2001. These are compared in Figure 1.  
The level of wages in East German establishments quite evidently shows a distribu-
tion much more closely around the median than that in West German establish-
ments. The share of establishments in East Germany is much higher in the medium 
wage segment, while the West German establishments are relatively more strongly 
represented in the clearly lower and higher wage segments. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                            
7
 The margins of 1.6 in the West and 1.3 in the East were determined with the modification of 
“Silverman’s rule of thumb” proposed in Härdle (2001). 
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Figure 1: 
Core Density Estimate of the Distribution of Establishment Wages in East and West Germany 
The evidently lower degree of wage differences between establishments in East Ger-
many can be quantified through a comparison of the variance in wages paid by estab-
lishments in the two parts of Germany. In 2001, the variance in the wage level in East 
German establishments was 427. In West Germany, it reached an amount of 828 in 
the same year. Measured by the variance, therefore, the differentiation in wages paid 
by establishments in East Germany is only about half as great as that in West Ger-
many (table 2). In a comparative analysis of the wage differences between establish-
ments in the two parts of the country, however, it must also be borne in mind that the 
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level of wages is lower in East Germany.8 However, the relative variability of the estab-
lishment wage level, expressed through the coefficient of variation, also indicates a 
clearly lower wage differentiation between establishments in East Germany. 
Table 2: 
Wage Differences between Establishments in East and West Germany in 2001 
 
How is the undoubtedly much smaller wage differentiation in East Germany than in 
West Germany to be explained? Bearing in mind the considerations on the determi-
nants of establishment wage levels, one explanation could be the influence of differ-
ent economic structures in East and West Germany. 
If differences in the composition of the economy by branches and size of establish-
ments play a part, an explanation of the smaller differentiation in wages between es-
tablishments could be the differences in wage agreements with trade unions. 
But, if there are clear deviations in wage differentiation between East and West Ger-
many for establishments of comparable size and branch as well, this rather points to 
different forms of rent sharing. This would give greater weight to explanations that 
see the wage differences between establishments as due to differences in the com-
panies’ earnings situations and market power. 
                                            
8
 The wage gap between East and West Germany is measured here on average for firms and is no-
ticeably lower than if it were calculated on the basis of the averages for the number employed 
(Görzig/Gornig/Werwatz, 2004). The deviation in the average figures should mainly be due to the fact 
that the wage differences between East and West Germany are particularly marked in big firms. 
Variance in establishment wage levels  In euro² 427,2 828,4 51,6
Memo item:
Coefficient of variation In % 45,2 55,5 81,4
Average wage level for establishments In euro 45,8 51,9 88,2
a Wage level measured as the average day’s wage per person employed in the establishment.
Source: Federal Labour Agency, Annual reports for employment statistics.
Difference 
East in % of 
West
East 
Germany 
West 
Germany 
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To determine the quantitative importance of economic structures for the differences 
in the variance of establishment wage levels between West and East Germany the 
amount of the raw difference in the variance of East and West Germany of 401 has 
been analysed in accordance with the non-parametric decomposition approach 
shown (cf. table 3). 
Table 3: 
Components of the Wage Differentiation between Establishments in East and West Germany in 
2001  
In the first step, that part of the raw difference in the variance of both parts of Ger-
many was established that results from the variance of the means of the wage level 
of all 540 sector- and size-specific types of establishment. This component was 125 
larger in West Germany in 2001 than in East Germany. So simply differences in the 
wage spread between each type of establishment in West and East Germany explain 
31 % of the total raw difference between the total variances of establishment wage 
levels. The differences in wages paid by establishments of different size and in dif-
ferent branches are clearly much greater in West Germany than in East Germany. 
In addition, differences between the two parts of Germany in the composition of es-
tablishments by sector and size, with their typical wage patterns, can also affect the 
difference in the sum of the variances for each type of establishment. Clearly of mi-
nor relevance is the fact that certain types of establishment are only represented in 
East or West Germany. The special components East and West show values of 
nearly zero. The negative value for the special component West should be inter-
Euro 401,2 125,0 -0,1 0,0 28,1 248,2
in % 100,0 31,2 0,0 0,0 7,0 61,9
Source: Federal Labour Agency, Annual reports for employment statistics. 
Difference between West 
Germany and East 
Germany
Components of the 
difference
Variance 
total
Economic structure components
Regional 
component
Variance of 
conditional 
means
Type structure 
component
Special component
Means of conditional variances
West East
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preted as that the types of establishment that only occur in West Germany show a 
wage differentiation that is even lower than the average in East Germany. 
Structural economic factors provide a greater explanation of the raw difference in the 
variances in establishment wage levels. That is principally because each type of es-
tablishment in both parts of Germany is represented, but the relative number of es-
tablishments of each type differs in West and East. This influence is expressed in the 
type structure component, which amounted to 28 in 2001. That means that 7 % of 
the raw difference in the variances in establishment wage levels was due to the fact 
that of the 540 types of establishment considered, those with particularly high inter-
nal inter-establishment wage differentiation played a larger part in West Germany 
than in East Germany. 
Altogether, however, even then only just under 40 % of the smaller wage differentia-
tion between establishments in East Germany, measured by the variance, can be 
shown to be due to structural differences from West Germany. The greater part of 
the raw difference in the variances in establishment wage levels between West and 
East Germany is due to the fact that companies of the same branch and size in East 
Germany show much lower wage deviations than those in West Germany. The re-
gional component, which reflects the deviations in the variance in the same types 
reached 248 in 2001 and so explains more than 60 % of the raw difference in the 
variances in establishment wage levels. 
The results of the decomposition of wage differences between establishments shown 
here agree with the latest empirical results on the determinants of establishment 
wage levels reached in other countries as well (Martins, 2004; Basu/Estrin/Svejnar, 
2004; Abowd/Kramarz/Lengermann/Roux, 2005). The branch the establishment be-
longs to and its size largely determine the level of the wages it pays, since as proxy 
variables they reflect the influence of the use of different production technologies and 
different institutional conditions on the labour market. But great differences in the 
wages paid by establishments within the same branch and size class still remain, 
and these type-specific wage differences can chiefly be regarded as the expression 
of the different market power of the establishments on their sales markets. 
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6 Conclusion 
Wage differentiation between establishments in East Germany increased noticeably 
in the 1990s. Nevertheless, the variance in establishment wage levels is still much 
lower than in West Germany. If East Germany’s wage level and employment level 
were to be improved, at least against the West, further differentiation in the wages 
paid by different establishments would appear to be necessary. There is, however, 
need for adjustment in inter-firm wage differentiation in two directions. 
Part of the adjustment needed is in the low wage segment. The share of establish-
ments in East Germany that pay only under-average wages is much lower than in 
West Germany. But measures that tackle the institutional conditions on the labour 
market do not appear to be very promising to achieve an increase in the share of 
low-wage establishments in East Germany. Deviations from the collectively agreed 
rates downward are already possible to a much greater extent in East Germany than 
in West Germany, owing to the generally lower number of establishments bound by 
the collective agreements and the greater number of opt-out clauses. 
It must be asked whether the causes of the lack of low-wage establishments in East 
Germany are not of a different kind. One reason could be the after-effects of the 
planned economy in the GDR, where wage structures were very homogeneous. In 
other words, the lesser degree of differentiation is still the expression of economic 
structures that are changing only slowly in the transition process. Another possible 
reason could be the connection between the distribution of income and regional de-
mand, for example the demand for simple services. This argument is also used to 
explain employment gaps between Europe and the United States 
(Stille/Preissl/Schupp, 2003). 
One part of the adjustment needed in wage differentiation in East Germany - and 
presumably the greater part - is an increase in the share of firms that pay considera-
bly above the average. The importance of these firms for the total wage spread is 
much greater in West Germany than in East Germany. The results of the decomposi-
tion of wage variances have clearly shown that East Germany’s shortage here is not 
primarily the expression of notably different economic structures. Rather, the position 
of many West German firms in competition on sales markets seems to be so strong, 
even within the same branch and the same size category, that they can pay wages 
above the average for firms of their size. 
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A strategy of greater inter-firm wage differentiation in East Germany would therefore 
probably only be successful concerning the objectives of employment and income if 
the competitive situation for firms can be improved across a broad front. Economic 
policy can support such a process, for instance by promoting innovation in East Ger-
many across a similarly broad front.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1:  
Detailed exposition of the decomposition of  [ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W - | ( | , )X EE Var Y x Eé ùë û . 
Using Nopo’s (2002) extension of the well-known work of Blinder (1973) and Oxaca 
(1973) we decompose the difference between [ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W  and [ ]| ( | , )X EE Var Y x E  
into the following four additive components:  
[ ] [ ]
{
| |
(i) Special component (ii) Different weight for (iii) West-East differences of the variance
comparable type of firms for comparable types of fir
( | , ) ( | , )X W X E
West East Typ Reg
E Var Y x W E Var Y x E-
= D + D + D + D142443 {
ms 
 
WestD , is the component specific to the West. It represents the part of 
[ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W - | ( | , )X EE Var Y x Eé ùë û  that can be attributed to those types of estab-
lishments that can be found exclusively in the West („WO“ = „West Only“). WestD  is 
formally defined as the difference between the average type-specific variance of the 
kinds of establishments found in the West only, and the average type-specific vari-
ance of those Western establishments, whose type is also observed in the East, 
weighted by the fraction of Western establishments with no match in the East, 
( )WP WO : 
( ) ( ) ( )
( ) ( )( | , ) ( | , )
W W
W W
f x f x W
West P WO P WAE
x WO x WAE
Var Y x W Var Y x W P WO
Î Î
ì ü
D = -í ý
î þ
å å  
 
EastD  is the component specific to the East. It represents the part of [ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W -
| ( | , )X EE Var Y x Eé ùë û  that can be attributed to those types of establishments that can be 
found exclusively in the East („EO“=“East Only”). EastD , is formally defined as the dif-
ference between the average type-specific variance of the kinds of establishments 
found in the East only, and the average type-specific variance of those Eastern es-
tablishments, whose type is also observed in the West, weighted by the fraction of 
Eastern establishments with no match in the West, ( )EP EO : 
( ) ( ){ } ( )( ) ( )( | , ) ( | , )E EE Ef x f x EEast P WAE P EO
x WAE x EO
Var Y x E Var Y x E P EO
Î Î
D = -å å  
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TypD  represents the part of [ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W - | ( | , )X EE Var Y x Eé ùë û  that can be attributed 
to unequal distributions in the West and the East of establishment types found in 
both parts of the country . It arises from the fact that some establishment types are 
found both in the East and the West („WAE“=“West And East”) – but with unequal 
relative frequencies (different “type structures”). It is formally defined as the sum of 
the type-specific variances in the West, weighted by the difference of the distribu-
tions with which these establishment types are observed in the West and East, re-
spectively:: 
( ) ( ){ }( ) ( )[ | , ] W EW Ef x f xTyp P WAE P WAE
x WAE
Var Y x W
Î
D = -å  
 
Finally, RegD  represents the part of [ ]| ( | , )X WE Var Y x W - | ( | , )X EE Var Y x Eé ùë û  that can be at-
tributed to the West-East differences in plant-level wage variability among those es-
tablishments found in both parts of the country – i.e., the “true” regional variance dif-
ferential between otherwise observationally identical establishments. It is formally 
defined as the sum of the type-specific East-West variance differentials, weighted by 
the fraction with which each type is found in the East:: 
{ }
( )
( )( | , ) ( | , )
E
E
f x
Reg P WAE
x WAE
Var Y x E Var Y x W
Î
D = -å   
In the empirical part, the variance functions ( | , )Var Y x E  and ( | , )Var Y x W , that are in-
tegral parts of all four components, are not assumed to adhere to a particular para-
metric functional relationship with the establishment type x. They will be nonparamet-
rically estimated instead by calculating variances separately for each plant type x in 
both parts of the country. 
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Appendix 2: Applied Industry Classification 
No. Industry
1 Agriculture, forestry, fishing 00 - 03
2 Energy, w ater supply 04
3 Coal mining 05
4 Other mining 04 - 08
5 Chemical products 09, 10
6 Refining, coke 11
7 Plastics 12
8 Rubber products 13
9 Quarrying 14
10 Ceramics 15
11 Glas products 16
12 Iron and steel 17
13 Non ferrous metals 18
14 Foundries 19
15 Steel mills 20 - 22
16 Steel industry 23, 24
17 Machinery equipment 26, 27
18 Office and data processing equipment 33
19 Road vehicles 28, 29
20 Vessels 31
21 Aircrafts and spacecrafts 32
22 Electrical engineering 34
23 Precision and optical instruments 35, 36
24 Metal products 37
25 Furniture, toys 38, 39
26 Wood 40
27 Wood products 41, 42, 53
28 Pulp and paper 430
29 Paper products 431 - 433
30 Printing 44
31 Leather 45, 46
32 Textiles 47 - 51
33 Clothing 52
34 Food 54 - 56
35 Bevrages 57
36 Tobacco 58
37 Buildings and construction 59, 60
38 Auxiliary construction 25, 61
39 Wholesale trade 620, 621
40 Retail trade 622 - 625
41 Railw ays 63
42 Other transports 65 - 68 
43 Post and telecommunication 64
44 Banking 690
45 Insurances 691
46 Hotels and restaurants 70, 71
47 Education 74 -77
48 Health 78
49 Cleaning, personal services 72, 73
50 Consulting 79
51 Other services 80 - 85
52 General government 91 - 94
53 Private households, NISPH 87 - 90
54 Others
BA Classifaction
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Appendix 3: Applied Establishment Size Classes 
1 1
2 2 - 9
3 10 -19
4 20 - 49
5 50 - 99
6 100 - 199
7 200 - 499
8 500 - 999
9 1000 - 4999
10 5000 and more
Size class Number of employees 
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